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II.
A.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

State v. Barton does not control this case.
Chavis argued that he could assert an entrapment defense, even though he

testified that he was not guilty of the charge, as defendant need not concede that he
or she committed the crime to be entitled to an entrapment instruction. Mathews v.

United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66 (1988).
1.

This Court's cases

The state argues that State v. Barton, 154 Idaho 289, 292 (2013), holds that
"the entrapment defense in not available to a defendant that has never admitted to
committing any of the underlying offenses," and controls this case.

That is not so.

While Barton states that "[t]he precedent in Idaho is clear" on this point (id.), it cites
only to Suits v. Idaho Bd. ofProf'] Discipline, 138 Idaho 397 (2003), for that
assertion.

In Suits, however, the statement that Dr. Suits was not in a position to

assert an entrapment defense, due to his "defense that the criminal offense did not
happen" is dicta because the issue was resolved on a different ground.

The holding

in the case is that Dr. Suits did not present sufficient evidence to justify the giving of
an entrapment defense.

This Court wrote: "We refuse to set aside the Board's

decision because the evidence presented to the Board does not support the
entrapment defense nor does it show spoliation of evidence."

138 Idaho at 400.

In

support of its holding, the Court noted that "Dr. Suits was given the opportunity to
present evidence in support of his entrapment claim, but the jury in the criminal
trial rejected the entrapment defense and the tribunals in the disciplinary
1

proceedings have found that the facts do not support the defense. This Court is
required to defer to the Board's findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous."
138 Idaho at 400 n.2. 1
Additional evidence that the Suits Court's per se bar language is dicta is
found in the Court's citation to authority for that proposition: "See State v. Mata,
106 Idaho 184, 185-186, 677 P.2d 497, 498-499 (Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that
entrapment defense necessarily implies that defendant admits to engaging in the
criminal acts)."

138 Idaho at 400.

Three things stand out from that.

Mata is a Court of Appeals' opinion, not a holding of this Court.

First is that

Plainly, this Court

gives serious consideration to the opinions of the Court of Appeals, but is not bound
by the rulings of that Court.
Second, the Suits Court uses the qualifier "See," which acknowledges that the
authority is not on point but is supportive only when an inferential step is taken
from the holding itself.
(18 th Ed. 2005).

The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation Rule 1.2(a)

Thus, this Court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals' opinion

in Mata did not clearly hold that entrapment is not available to a defendant who
denies committing the offense.
1

If the district court presiding over the criminal case gave an entrapment
instruction, it must have concluded the defense was available to Suits. And if the
jury rejected the entrapment defense at trial, this Court could have resolved the
issue in the disciplinary proceedings on the basis of res judicata, without reaching
the issue of whether entrapment was even available. However, based upon the
discussion in a later case, it appears that this Court may be mistaken over whether
the district court gave an entrapment instruction. The Court of Appeals in Suits v.
State, 143 Idaho 160, 165 (Ct. App. 2006), held that Suits's trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to request an entrapment instruction. Suits v. State, will be
discussed in greater detail below.
2

Third, as explained below, an examination of Mata shows that it is not even
supportive authority for the proposition for which Suits cited it.
2.

The Court of Appeals' cases

In Mata, the defendant admitted to making at least two deliveries of heroin to
a police informant.

The trial court gave an entrapment instruction but the

defendant was convicted anyway. On appeal, he challenged the jury's
determination of that issue.

The entrapment instruction given to the jury was not

challenged on appeal, nor was it even made part of the record.

The Court of

Appeals thus "presume[d] that the jury applied proper instructions to the evidence
when it convicted Mata and rejected his entrapment defense."

106 Idaho at 187.

It then found the jury verdict was supported by substantial, competent evidence,
writing that:
The verdict of a properly instructed jury will not be overturned if it is
supported by substantial, competent evidence. The jury is entitled to draw all
justifiable inferences from the evidence. E.g., State v. Greensweig, 103 Idaho
50, 644 P.2d 372 (Ct.App.1982). Here, if the subjective approach to
entrapment were applied, we believe the record contains substantial evidence
upon which the jury justifiably could infer that Mata had been predisposed to
engage in heroin transactions when given the opportunity to do so.
Conversely, if the objective standard were applied, we believe the conduct of
the government's agents would not have induced an average person, not
already predisposed to engage in heroin transactions, to commit the offense
charged here. There has been no showing of oppressive or coercive
government conduct which might, under either the subjective or objective test,
preclude a conviction. Cf, e.g., United States v. McClure, 546 F.2d 670 (5th
Cir.1977) (reversing conviction upon showing of intimidation). Accordingly, we
conclude that Mata's conviction will not be set aside upon the ground of
entrapment.
106 Idaho at 187.
As is manifest, the Court of Appeals' holding in Mata provides no support for
3

the proposition that the entrapment defense is not available to a defendant that does
not admit committing the underlying offenses.
not even tangentially.

That question was not presented,

Thus, in fact, neither the dicta in Suits nor the holding in

Mata are clear precedent for the proposition cited in Barton.
In addition, Mata is distinguishable on its facts and its language was at best
dicta.

As noted, Mata involved a defendant accused of selling heroin.

At trial

Mata raised an entrapment defense and the jury was instructed on this defense.
Trial testimony revealed that Mata was a heroin addict who had used drugs in the
presence of the undercover agent.

The undercover agent went to Mata's home and

asked him to help him buy some heroin.

Mata agreed and went with the agent.

Mata gave the agent's money to one individual and then drove with the agent to
another location where Mata obtained the drugs and gave them to the agent.
Evidence was presented that Mata also helped the agent buy drugs on other
occasions.

Mata, 106 Idaho at 186-187. Mata testified on his own behalf. 2

On appeal, the issue before the court was whether Idaho law applies an
objective, subjective, or hybrid test of entrapment.

The issue at hand was whether

the defense of entrapment was a question for the court or for the jury.

Deciding

that the Idaho Supreme Court had not yet addressed the issue in a majority opinion,
it went on to discuss the standard for each test.

The Court of Appeals concluded,

without deciding what the correct application in Idaho should be, that it would apply

The content of Mata's trial testimony is not discussed by the court, thus it is not
clear whether Mata admitted any elements of the offense charged.
2

4

the subjective test to the case at hand because in previous cases the Supreme Court
had discussed the question of entrapment as a question for the jury.
The court noted that an objective test would yield the same result.

Id. at 186.
Ibid.

Nowhere in Mata does the Court of Appeals discuss whether a defendant
raising an entrapment defense must admit to all the elements of the offense charged.
The court's discussion about objective vs. subjective approaches to entrapment was
addressed solely on the question of whether entrapment is to be resolved by the jury
or the judge, and not whether a defendant must admit the elements of the offense in
order to raise the defense.
A second issue raised on appeal by Mata was whether the court improperly
limited the presentation of defense evidence when the court prohibited Mata's wife
from testifying.

Apparently believing that the wife's testimony might lead to an

alibi defense, the trial court precluded her testimony.

Id. at 188.

In finding the

trial court erred in excluding this testimony, the court nevertheless found no
prejudice because there was no offer of proof as to what alibi testimony would have
been given and because the alibi theory would have been inconsistent with the
entrapment defense, and therefore the error was harmless.

Ibid.

An alibi defense is inconsistent with entrapment because the defendant
denies even being at the scene of the crime; if a defendant is not present to commit
the offense, he cannot also be entrapped into committing it.

In contrast, there is no

reason why a defendant who admits being at the scene and committing certain acts
may nevertheless also deny that he was aware of the nature of the controlled
5

substance or that he possessed the requisite intent should be deemed ineligible to
present an entrapment defense.
In fact, the Court of Appeals has recognized that there was no binding
precedent to support Suits v. Idaho Bd. at the time that case was decided.

In the

appeal from the denial of Suits's post-conviction petition, the Court of Appeals noted
that, at the time of Suits's trial, "Idaho courts ha[d] not explicitly held whether this
state permits a defendant to deny some or all of the elements of an offense while still
claiming entrapment."

Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 163 (Ct. App. 2006). As

Mata was decided in 1984, and Suits was not even arrested until December 31, 1998,
it necessarily follows that the Court of Appeals did not consider Mata to stand for the
proposition it was cited in Suits v. Idaho Bd.

Otherwise, it would have stated that

the rule against inconsistent defense was established at the time of the trial.

Suits

v. State, 143 Idaho at 163.
Further, the Court of Appeals did not even consider this Court's dicta in Suits
to be the holding of the Court.

Instead, it wrote, "[w]e are constrained to follow the

Supreme Court's indication in Suits that Idaho follows the rule prohibiting
inconsistent defenses."

Suits v. State, 143 Idaho at 164 (emphasis added).

Contrary to Mata, but not cited by this Court in Suits v. Idaho Bd., is State v.

Tucker, 97 Idaho 4 (1976), which held that an attorney may have denied his client
the effective assistance of counsel by submitting the entrapment issue to the jury
rather than the judge. 3

3

At the time of the trial in Tucker, the defendant had the choice of presenting the
6

In Tucker, the defendant admitted his presence at the scene of the offense, but
denied that he participated in the actual drug sale.

97 Idaho at 6-7.

Nevertheless,

this Court did not question whether Tucker was entitled to raise an entrapment
defense even though he did not admit all the elements of the offense.

Thus, there

was case law support for providing an entrapment instruction defense in Suits,
which was not considered by this Court.
In addition, this Court's approved jury instruction in no way requires a full
admission of all the elements necessary to establish guilt before the jury may
consider the defense.

Instead, ICJI 1513 states, "Even though the defendant may

have [e.g. sold the drugs] as charged by the state, if it was the result of entrapment
then you must find the defendant not guilty."

(Emphasis added.)

The instruction

does not require the defendant admit all the elements of the offense before he is
entitled to raise the defense.

This instruction was approved in State v. Henry, 138

Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App 2003), as an accurate statement of the law on entrapment.
The Comment to the entrapment instruction notes that the instruction
"should be given only if the defendant has produced 'some substantial evidence'
supporting the defense of entrapment."

ICJI 1513, Comment.

Thus, to be entitled

to an entrapment instruction there need only be a reasonable view of the evidence
presented that would support the theory of entrapment.

See, e.g., State v. Canelo,

129 Idaho 386, 392 (Ct. App. 1996) (to prevail on appeal where an entrapment was

entrapment issue to either a judge or a jury. That issue is not relevant here, as
entrapment under the current law is a jury issue.
7

denied, the defendant need only demonstrate that a reasonable view of the evidence
presented would support the theory of entrapment instruction).
That a defendant is not required to admit all the elements of the offense
charged before being entitled to an entrapment instruction is evident in State v.

Henry, supra. There, the defendant, an attorney, was charged with trafficking
methamphetamine after a client of Henry's told the police that he had used cocaine
and methamphetamine to pay for Henry's legal services.

The police recruited the

client to carry out an undercover drug investigation after the client had been
arrested on drug charges.
Per police instructions, the client placed a recorded telephone call to Henry,
indicating that he wanted to make some payment to Henry for his legal services
before leaving town.

Henry agreed to meet the client later that night.

undercover agent accompanied the client to meet Henry.

An

Henry approached the

client's car and after some discussion asked, "Do you have anything for me?"

The

undercover agent gave Henry a clear plastic package containing a white powdery
substance.

Police officers arrested Henry as he drove away.

At trial, evidence was presented that Henry received methamphetamine as a
form of payment for his legal fees.

Henry claimed that he did not know the nature

of the substance he received from the undercover agent, and if anything, he believed
it was cocaine not methamphetamine.

An entrapment instruction was given to the

Jury.
On appeal Henry objected to the pattern entrapment jury instruction (ICJI
8

1513) that was given to the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury instruction

correctly stated the law and upheld the jury's verdict.

Nowhere in the Henry

decision does the court conclude, or even imply, that the entrapment instruction
should not have been given because Henry denied knowledge of the nature of the
illegal substance.
3.

Summary

The state is incorrect in its assertion that Barton controls this case.

Barton

relies upon dicta from Suits v. Idaho Bd. OfProf] Discipline, which, in turn, relies
upon, at most, dicta from State v. Mata.

Moreover, in Mata, the alternative defense

was alibi, which was entirely inconsistent with an entrapment defense, unlike in

Suits v. Idaho Bd. or Barton.

The Court of Appeals itself acknowledged Mata did

not establish a bar on inconsistent defense in Suits v. State.

At the same time,

Suits v. Idaho Bd. does not cite to or discuss this Court's decision in State v. Tucker
or the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Henry, cases where entrapment
instructions were given even though inconsistent defenses were put forth.

Nor does

Suits v. Idaho Bd. recognize the Court's own pattern jury instruction on entrapment
acknowledges there may be cases where the defendant has not committed the
offense but may still assert entrapment.

B.

This Court should now adopt the Mathews rule.
The United States Supreme Court held in Mathews v. United States, "that

even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled to an
entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a
9

reasonable jury could find entrapment."

485 U.S. at 62.

It determined that was

the best rule to apply because it was in line with the "general proposition [that] a
defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there
exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor."

485 U.S. at 63,

citing Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896); and 4 C. Torcia, Wharton's
Criminal Procedure § 538, p. 11 (12th ed. 1976).

It noted that a parallel rule had

been applied in the context of a lesser included offense instruction. Id.
While Mata discussed the two justifications for the entrapment defense, that
discussion does not support the Suits dicta because Mata indicated that Idaho cases
tended to follow the subjective justification. 4 And, that was the situation in

Mathews. As the Court wrote,
Suffice it to say that the Court has consistently adhered to the view ... that a
valid entrapment defense has two related elements: government inducement
of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to
engage in the criminal conduct. Predisposition, "the principal element in the
defense of entrapment," focuses upon whether the defendant was an "unwary
innocent" or instead, an "unwary criminal" who readily availed himself of the
opportunity to perpetrate the crime. The question of entrapment is generally
one for the jury, rather than for the court.

Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 62-63 (internal citations omitted).
Finally, a rule denying the presentation of inconsistent defenses denies a

4

The subjective justification is based upon "the principle that where criminal intent
is an element of an offense, such intent must originate in the defendant's mind," not
placed there by the government. The objective justification is meant "to discourage
official lawlessness in the name of law enforcement." The first focuses on the
defendant's subjective state of mind, the second on the objective actions of the
government. State v. Mata, 106 Idaho at 186. The Court of Appeals noted that its
holding would be the same regardless of which justification the jury was instructed
upon. Id.
10

defendant his right to present his defense to the jury.

See, Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 3012 (1973) (right to present witnesses).

The United

States Supreme Court has reaffirmed this basic constitutional right in Holmes v.

South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006), which rejected a rule which limited a
defendant's right to present evidence that a third party committed the offense.

The

requirement that a defendant fully admit his guilt in order to be able to present an
entrapment defense is analogous to state law rule rejected in Holmes.

Thus,

Ma thews is the better-reasoned rule and should be adopted by this Court.
C.

The trial court erred in refusing to give an entrapment instruction because there
was sufficient evidence to support the instruction.
A trial court must instruct the jury on "all matters of law necessary for their

information" and must give a requested jury instruction if it determines that
instruction to be correct and pertinent. LC.§ 19-2132(a). A requested instruction
must be given where: (1) it properly states the governing law; (2) a reasonable view of
the evidence would support the defendant's legal theory; (3) it is not addressed
adequately by other jury instructions; and (4) it does not constitute an impermissible
comment as to the evidence.

State v. Fetterly, 126 Idaho 4 75, 4 76-77 (Ct. App.

1994).
The state does not contend that the first, second, and fourth Fetterly
requirements are absent.

It only argues that "the evidence at trial did not support

an entrapment instruction."

Respondent's Brief, pg. 10.

However, that is not the

case.
First, only slight evidence raising the issue of entrapment is necessary for
11

submission of the issue to the jury.
Cir. 2003).

United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 951 (9th

"A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on every defense or

theory of defense having any support in the evidence."

State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho

323, 328 (Ct. App. 1999).
The state's citation to State v. Whitlock, 82 Idaho 540 (1960), does not aid its
cause.

There, the police simply approached Whitlock while he was at work, asked

him to "fix him up" and Whitlock asked "What would you like?" before he provided
illegal liquor to the officer.

This evidence demonstrated that Whitlock was already

in the business of selling illegal liquor and needed no persuasion to continue to
engage in the business.

Here, Chavis presented evidence that he was not

predisposed to commit a crime and the idea for committing the crime came from an
agent of the state and not from him.

The same distinction holds true for State v.

Ingram, 138 Idaho 768 (Ct. App. 2003), another case relied upon by the state.
As has been noted, in order to post a "women seeking men" ad on craigslist the
user must click on a link with the notice:

"By clicking on the link below, you

confirm that you are 18 or older and understand that personals may include adult
content."

Exhibits, pg. 49.

Thus, Chavis could reasonably believe the person he

was chatting with was over eighteen even though she claimed to be younger.

A

reasonable juror could conclude, as Chavis did, that an adult was pretending to be
younger.

Role playing is, of course, common in such chat rooms.

Further, during the discussions with "Haley" he made it clear that he was
only interested in someone over the age of consent. Chavis wrote: "Just to be clear
12

this is just to hang out. I am not promising anything sexual. I'm pretty sure you are
the age of consent but it's kinda confusing looking online while driving. I don't
wanna get in trouble[.]" In response to this, the Agent aggressively encouraged
Chavis to overcome his qualms.

"Natalie" responded: "wtf Tim!!! that's not what I

said! I don't want to just hang outs if I wanted to hang out I wud have gone with my
sister lol" and "lol seriously don't want to jus hang out.sorry.we only hav a couple
hours anyway." Exhibits, pg. 37.
Next, the state writes that Chavis "erroneously claims" that Agent Sutehall
was not predisposed to commit an offense.
the state which is mistaken.

Respondent's Brief, Pg. 14.

But it is

The agent testified he "cut off the communication

because it didn't meet the threshold that I was looking for. I didn't feel like there was
a real threat there[.]"

T pg. 252, ln. 19-23. The agent testified that Chavis was not

a "real threat" because he was not predisposed to commit a crime.
would have continued to pursue Chavis.

Otherwise he

Even the trial prosecutor had to concede

opening statements that this "conversation didn't really go anywhere ... just kind of
fizzled out." T pg. 114, ln. 8-9.
In any case, the state's argument that was counter-evidence to the
entrapment defense misses the point.
evidence that Chavis was entrapped.
1996).

There only has to be a reasonable view of the

State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 392 (Ct. App.

Undisputed evidence establishing the defense is not required in order to be

entitled to an instruction.
has been established.

It is the jury's function to determine whether the defense

And, as set forth above and in the Opening Brief, Chavis
13

presented that quantum of evidence at trial.

Thus, the trial court erred in refusing

to instruct the jury on the entrapment defense.

D.

Fetterly, supra.

The state has not proved that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
"A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error

shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State
shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).

makes no attempt to argue the error was harmless.

III.

Here, the state

Thus, no reply is required.

CONCLUSION

In light of the above, Chavis Jackson asks the Court to vacate the judgment
and sentence, and remand the case for a new trial where the jury is instructed on
entrapment.
Respectfully submitted this 22 nd day of July, 2019.

Isl Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Chavis Jackson
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